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Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence 






This paper explores how the timing of career-contingent financial aid influences its effectiveness in encouraging 
law students to enter public interest work, and hence the isolated effect of educational debt timing on career 
choice. I analyze quasi-experimental data from NYU Law School’s Innovative Financial Aid Study, in which career-
contingent financial aid packages with equivalent net values but varying debt structures were randomly assigned 
to applicants. My results indicate that debt timing matters: law school graduates who receive tuition waivers rather 
than ex-post loan assistance have a 32% higher rate of first job placement in public interest law and a 91% higher 
rate of clerkships. Furthermore, recipients of tuition waivers are more likely to enroll in law school conditional on 
being admitted. Using propensity score methods to correct for sample selection bias at the matriculation stage, I 
find that differences in first job placement according to debt timing persist after controlling for differential 
enrollment rates, implying an independent post-enrollment influence of debt timing on career decisions. I present a 
behavioral model that rationalizes the time-inconsistency of career decisions when agents are both debt averse and 
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1  Introduction 
 
As public and private sector wages continue to diverge and educational debt levels rise, a growing 
number of professional schools are offering career-contingent financial aid packages aimed at increasing the 
incentive for graduates to pursue low-paying public interest work. The majority of career-contingent aid is 
awarded in the form of loan repayment assistance, although a few schools also offer tuition subsidies to 
entering students interested in non-profit careers. Despite the fact that career-contingent aid programs by 
and large favor retrospective debt relief over ex-ante tuition waivers, the importance of the timing of aid – 
and hence, the timing of educational debt – on career choice has never been evaluated. According to 
standard rational choice models, if the net present values are equal, current and future debt should have 
identical influence on career choices. However, as will be shown in this paper, if there is debt aversion, or 
disutility associated with debt beyond borrowing costs, the payout schedule of educational loans could 
influence career decisions.
1 To address this question I compare the impact of career-contingent tuition and 
loan repayment assistance on the job sector placement of law school graduates utilizing data from a 
randomized allocation of financial aid packages conducted over four years at New York University’s 
School of Law. Comparing students’ responses to financial aid packages of comparable monetary value 
but distinct payout schedules provides a unique opportunity to isolate the non-financial cost of debt and 
study the degree to which psychological debt burden influences career choices.  
 
Given the current social interest in encouraging public interest employment and the growing amount 
of funding allocated for this purpose, not only is this a relevant behavioral question, but one with important 
policy implications. In particular, is loan repayment the most efficient manner for a school interested in 
influencing career outcomes to allocate funds? Depending on the nature of debt aversion, tuition subsidies 
may be more effective in encouraging students to take low-paying jobs with high social value than are loan 
repayment programs which fail to alleviate debt burden. This policy implication is relevant in many 
educational settings where career-contingent financial aid is designed to steer people towards public 
interest work.
2 For instance, British public universities are considering a universal program of income-
contingent educational loans (Barr, et. al. , 1998). 
                                                 
1 There is substantial empirical evidence of debt aversion in many settings. For instance, payoff rates of mortgages and 
student loans are “irrationally” rapid. See Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) and Thaler (1992) for a discussion. 
2 See Appendix D-E for a survey of career-contingent financial aid programs.                                                                                                              
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The first section of the paper describes the NYU financial aid experiment in detail. I then present 
experimental results which indicate that graduates indeed respond differently to up-front tuition subsidies 
and retrospective debt relief programs when making career choices. In particular, law school graduates 
who receive tuition waivers while in school have a significantly higher rate of first job placement in public 
interest law as well as a substantially higher rate of clerkships. Furthermore, debt timing appears to 
influence the matriculation decisions of law school applicants, such that recipients of tuition waivers are 
more likely to enroll conditional on being admitted. The second half of the paper disentangles the role of 
anticipated educational debt on enrollment decisions from the effect of debt while in school on first job 
choice using propensity score methods to correct for sample selection bias at the matriculation stage. 
Ultimately, differences in public interest law placement according to financial aid timing persist after 
controlling for differential matriculation rates on observables, suggesting an independent post-enrollment 
influence of debt aversion on career decisions. The effect of financial aid package on clerkships, however, 
appears to be largely explained by high-ability applicants selecting into the pool of tuition subsidy recipients 
during enrollment.   
 
2  Project Background 
 
2.1 Career-contingent Financial Aid 
 
At the country's premier law schools, students are graduating with average educational debt 
between $70,000 and $80,000, and the figure is rising. The primary source of growing indebtedness is the 
rapid rise in law school tuition: As Table 1 illustrates, between 1987 and 1997, law school tuition at both 
private and public law schools more than doubled (Kornhauser et. al., 1995). 
 
Table 1. Average Law School Tuition 
  1987-88  1997-98 
Public School  $2810  $7035 
Private School  $9048  $19256 
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At the same time, wages in private sector and public interest jobs have steadily diverged. Table 2 
reports the difference in private and public sector average starting salaries for graduates from New York 
University’s School of Law in the classes of 1998-2001: 
 
Table 2. Annual Mean Starting Salaries 
  Class of 1998  Class of 1999  Class of 2000  Class of 2001 
Public interest law  $34494  $36006  $36523  $39922 
Private sector  $95783  $100872  $124355  $123517 
 
There is growing concern that educational debts of the current magnitude dissuade even the most 
dedicated lawyer from taking a public interest job. In response, many law schools have initiated career-
contingent financial aid policies designed to increase incentives for public interest work by reducing 
educational debt burden. At present, career-contingent loan repayment assistance programs (LRAP), 
which are largely funded and administered by law schools, are by far the most common form of career-
contingent financial aid.
3 Loan repayment assistance defrays or, in some instances, fully covers the 
educational debt payments of graduates once they enter qualifying public service jobs. While in 1986 there 
were only five law school LRAPs nationwide, today there are 47 law school and four state LRAPs.
4 In 
contrast, career-contingent public service scholarships (PSS) are far less common. PSS are broadly 
defined as tuition grants to entering law students who express interest in public service careers with 
conditional repayment clauses in the case that students take private sector jobs. While LRAP is at most law 
schools available to anyone who pursues qualifying work, PSS are almost universally offered as merit-
based awards to a select few. Through the new aid packages offered under the Innovative Financial Aid 
Study, NYU Law School was the first and only school to offer both types of aid to interested students 
regardless of relative merit or need. 
 
2.2   The New York University Innovative Financial Aid Study 
 
NYU Law School's Mel and Barbara Weiss Loan Repayment Assistance Program (LRAP) was 
                                                 
3 There are also a handful of LRAP programs sponsored by state governments and employers (see Appendix D). 
4 LRAP programs vary greatly in the amount of debt assistance offered and the eligibility requirements, some paying 
only a fraction of tuition costs while others cover the full amount. See the NAPIL web site: <www.napil.org>.                                                                                                              
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among the first LRAPs in the country. A 1993 enhancement of  funding made it also one of the most 
generous loan assistance programs anywhere. At NYU, for all graduates who choose careers in the public 
sector or other low paying fields of law, the majority of educational loans incurred during law school are 
forgiven through LRAP.
5 As Table 3 illustrates, it is currently the second largest loan repayment program in 
the country. 
 
Table 3: Law School Loan Repayment Programs 
Total LRAP Funds Disbursed  (1998-99) 
Yale Law School  $1,369,061 
New York University Law School  $1,091,579 
Harvard Law School  $1,069,081 
Columbia University School of Law  $748,179 
Stanford University Law School  $546,148 
Georgetown University Law Center  $511,034 
 
Additionally, in 1997, NYU Law School announced a $10 million research initiative, the Innovative 
Financial Aid Study (IFAS), which further expanded the amount of available career-contingent aid. The 
program was deemed innovative for two primary reasons. First, as mentioned in Section 2.1, in addition to 
LRAP, the IFAS offered two forms of career-contingent tuition subsidies to students in the NYU Law 
classes of 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 interested in public service careers. The NYU public service 
scholarship (PSS) provided a grant of two-thirds tuition that converted to a loan in the event that a recipient 
did not pursue a career in public interest law.
6 In addition, under IFAS, NYU expanded its Root-Tilden-
Kern (RTK) Scholarship program, which also provided two-thirds tuition as well as an array of public 
service seminars, discussion groups, and other activities at the Law School to a select group of merit-
                                                 
5 LRAP provides quarterly prospective funding to alumni for up to ten years following graduation, providing all other 
conditions are met. Full time employees who work 35 hours or more each week, and who work in a position that “involves 
law” as determined by NYU, are eligible for the program. The program for the Class of 2004 defines "low-paying" as an 
income of less than $57,651annually. The "qualifying income" is gross income minus adjustments made for: annual debt 
service on educational debts, dependents,  medical expenses, other LRAP benefits, and spouse's income.  
6 Specifically, a legally binding contract stipulated that any PSS recipient who took a non qualifying job during the first 
ten years of his or her career had to repay a prorated fraction of the scholarship according to a repayment schedule 
matching federal loan terms. Graduates who leave public interest work prior to the required ten years must pay back the 
amorticized portion of their tuition scholarship corresponding to the portion of time spent in the private sector.                                                                                                              




The key innovation of the IFAS, however, was the randomized allocation of all PSS and a subset 
of RTK grants. Each year of the study, PSS were randomly assigned by lottery across the entire pool of 
(admitted) applicants and RTK grants assigned by lottery to all merit-eligible applicants.
8 All lottery winners 
received scholarships of two-thirds tuition for three years of law school, while lottery losers received no 
tuition subsidy but were eligible to apply for two- and one-year PSS scholarships during their second and 
third years of law school. More importantly, all participants including lottery losers who entered public 
interest work were also eligible for LRAP for any portion of tuition loans not covered by subsidy. In total, 
179 lottery winners were selected from the pool of 321 applicants, consisting in 102 three-year (PSS0 and 
RTK), 57 two-year (PSS1), and 20 one-year (PSS2) scholarships.
9 
 
As part of the IFAS study, data was collected on all members of the four participating law school 
classes from six separate university sources: law school applications; financial aid applications; law school 
academic records from the registrar’s office; first-year entry surveys on work experience; personal debt; 
career goals and job preferences; third-year exit surveys with data identical to the entry survey but also 
including school and summer activity information; and work experience surveys mailed biennially to alumni 
for ten years following graduation. 
 
3  Conceptual Framework: LRAP versus PSS 
 
The key characteristic of the IFAS lotteries and the most important feature to note in comparing the 
two loan options is the fact that the two packages were designed to be equivalent in net present value. To 
illustrate, the following expense sheet available from the law school's Office of Financial Aid gives an idea 
                                                 
7 As opposed to debt conversion specified in a legally binding contract, RTK graduates have a “moral obligation” to 
repay their grants through charitable donations to the school if they earn a salary greater than the prevailing public 
interest salary during the first ten years after graduation. In this sense, RTK scholarships differ most markedly from the 
PSS in that they involve no legally binding obligation on the part of the recipient to repay the loan in the event that they 
leave or do not enter the public sector. Almost all RTK activities are open to the public. 
8 Only applicants meeting a merit-based criteria entered the RTK lottery. Among this pool, roughly 15% of applicants in 
the highest merit category were automatically awarded RTK scholarships and are thus excluded from my experimental 
analysis.  
9 Students who dropped out or failed to graduate within three years are excluded from these figures and the proceeding 
analysis.                                                                                                              
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of the relative debt burden faced by PSS recipients versus students eligible for LRAP only:  
 
Figure 1. 2000-2001 Federal Student Expense Budget:             
  Full Tuition + LRAP  Tuition Waiver (PSS) +  LRAP 
Annual Debt  $ 48,550  $ 29,183 
Total Debt [Annual x 3 years]:  $ 145,650  $ 87,550 
       
Total Amount of Available LRAP:  $ 145,650  $ 87,550 
 
While the first row of Figure 1 reveals a significant difference in annual student debt, due to the 
existence of LRAP and the career-contingent nature of PSS, there is no difference in the monetary 
values of the two financial aid packages.
10  Because PSS job eligibility requirements are identical to 
those of LRAP, and because PSS recipients are also eligible for LRAP for the portion of expenses 
financed by loans, the PSS is essentially loan forgiveness in reverse. To illustrate, assuming an annual tuition 
expense of $30,000, the expected cost of tuition, and therefore the monetary value to law school entrants 
of the two financial aid programs, can be written as: 
 
Figure 2: Expected cost of tuition by lottery outcome 
PSS lottery winners: 
(1)  E[Tuition|PSS+LRAP] = $30,000  +  p1 (-$30,000) + (1- p1)*($60,000) 
 
PSS lottery losers: 
(2)  E[Tuition|LRAP only] = $90,000 + p1 (-$90,000) + (1- p1)*(0) 
 
where p1 is the probability that a student takes an LRAP-qualifying job. 
 
In equation (1), because two-thirds is covered by the PSS, lottery winners are only responsible for 
$30,000 tuition while in school, which is repaid after they graduate if they take an LRAP-qualifying job. If 
they do not, they must repay the $60,000 loan after graduation. Equation (2) states that lottery losers are 
responsible for all $90,000 tuition in period 1, all of which is repaid in period 2 if they work in public 
interest law.  As the above expressions are equivalent, economic theory predicts a Von Neumann-
                                                 
10 Conditional on the availability of federal loans free of interest during school. Indeed, all applicants in the study 
received interest-free loans covering tuition through the school financial aid office.                                                                                                              
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Morgenstern utility-maximizing individual to be indifferent between winning and l osing the financial aid 
lottery. Hence, because both packages place the same financial penalty on private sector work, an 
individual should respond identically to the two forms of aid when choosing whether to take a public 
interest law job. Nonetheless, two distinct aspects of debt timing have the potential to generate differences 
in students’ valuations of the programs and corresponding differences in the likelihood of choosing public 
interest work in response to lottery outcome.  
 
1.  Risk value of debt  
 
If students perceive earlier debt to be costlier, they may require more financial compensation under 
an LRAP program to enter low-paying public interest work and therefore be less likely to choose a public 
sector job than are PSS recipients. The only difference in the real financial value of the two aid packages is 
the potential risk associated with the non-binding nature of the LRAP agreement.  Unlike under a 
contractual agreement such as the PSS entails, neither the existence of the LRAP program, nor the formula 
used by the program in a given year is guaranteed to remain constant by the time law school applicants 
enter the job market. Thus, any uncertainty regarding continuation of the program, change in benefit 
amount, change in eligibility requirements, or change in tax treatment of loan payments could cause risk-
averse students with debt to refocus their career towards the financially secure private sector. In spite of 
this potential uncertainty, given that NYU's LRAP is one of the oldest and most established loan programs 
in the country and NYU Law School sells itself as a school committed to public interest law, program 
discontinuation or cutbacks should be evaluated as highly unlikely by incoming students.
11  
 
Even if changes in the program are deemed unlikely, there are other potential financial costs of 
holding debt for three years. For instance, debt could limit access to credit for students considering large 
non-educational loan needs such as purchasing a house which may arise during law school. Finally, though 
it is reasonable to assume that law school entrants have substantial access to both private and public loans 
free of interest while in school, it is possible that applicants perceive themselves to be credit constrained. 
For example, since applicants may not receive federal loan application results as quickly as admissions 
                                                 
11 In fact, according to program coordinators, the school’s commitment to providing loan assistance was particularly 
emphasized to students in IFAS classes.                                                                                                              
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decisions, anticipation of credit constraints could also influence applicant’s preferences over the two types 
of financial aid.  
 
2.  Psychological debt aversion 
 
In addition to financial considerations, behavioral responses to debt could play a role in influencing 
graduates’ career choices. While the expected post-graduate debt payments of PSS recipients versus 
LRAP qualifiers are equal conditional on the probability of public interest employment, students’ debt levels 
while in school and upon graduating differ substantially: At the end of law school, the balance sheets of 
non-PSS-holders register up t o three years of actual debt to the federal government or private loan 
sources, while PSS holders face only the risk of future debt to the university. One possible reason that 
students’ employment  responses to LRAP and PSS could  differ is that individuals are not standard 
expected-utility-maximizers  in the sense that they evaluate  going into debt and debt forgiveness 
asymmetrically. This possible behavioral explanation is a  variation of the “loss aversion” model of 
Kahnammen and Tversky, in which individuals associate  higher disutility with a loss than the utility 
associated with an equivalent gain.
12  
 
Here I present a behavioral model based on this possibility that rationalizes debt aversion as a 
commitment device in a multi-stage decision in which individuals are subject to loss aversion, illustrated in 
Figure 3. The first characteristic of agents in this model is that they are debt averse. As long as going into 
debt is interpreted as a loss, a loss aversion framework can be applied to educational debt. While in the 
one-stage problem of Part A, which ignores debt experienced in the first stage, LRAP and PSS are 
evaluated identically, the existence of debt aversion requires modeling the financial aid lotteries as a two-
stage decision problem as in Part B. As a two-stage problem, the possibility of loss aversion has important 
implications for individuals’ response to each type of financial aid, since loss aversion has the potential to 
generate a preference reversal in the second stage under one financial aid package only. Thus, if debt 
averse individuals are also characterized by loss averse preferences, they may choose distinct careers 
depending on the timing of debt.  
                                                 
12 Kahneman and Tversky (1984) define loss aversion as “ the disutility of giving up an object being greater than 
the utility associated with acquiring it.”   
                                                                                                              








This potential dynamic inconsistency can be seen by considering the job choices of a loss averse 
individual at Stage 2 of the decision trees in part (b). Even if in (a) an individual would choose to go into 
public interest work to avoid the $90,000 loss, in the two-stage problem of (b), loss averse individuals may 
choose private sector over public interest work under LRAP only. Since, at the point when graduates are 
faced with the decision of which job sector to enter, they face a penalty in the case of PSS only, loss 
averse individuals will be more likely to enter the public sector under PSS than under LRAP. In other 
words, they choose $0 and a private sector job over $90,000 and a public interest job but not (-$90,000) 
and private sector work over $0 and public interest work. Whereas under LRAP, the loss associated with 
taking a private sector job has already been suffered so is not taken into account in the second stage, the 
PSS aid package avoids time-inconsistent career decisions by postponing the penalty aspect of career-
contingent financial aid. 
 
Figure 3. Job Sector Choice 
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In turn, ex-ante knowledge of this behavioral effect will cause scholarship applicants to assign 
higher probabilities to entering the public sector conditional on winning the PSS. As a result, students 
interested in committing themselves to public interest work will favor postponing debt in order to 
discourage themselves from entering the financially tempting private sector.  In this sense, tuition subsidies 
may serve as a commitment devise to a debt averse student cognizant of his nature.
13  
 
For the reasons outlined above, both loss averse and risk-related debt aversion have the potential 
to influence the career-related decision problems of financial aid recipients, generating a difference in public 
interest placement rates according to financial aid timing. Though not a separate causal factor, if the 
financial aid packages are perceived to be different on account of either factor, the expected matriculation 
rates among admitted applicants will differ according to debt timing. In this manner, a difference in job 
outcomes related to financial aid package will be generally associated with a corresponding difference in 
enrollment propensities.  
 
4  Construction of Control Group 
 
Participants in the experimental component of the IFAS included a total of 102 3-year, 57 2-year 
and 20 1-year scholarships assigned by lottery to the pool of 321 matriculating applicants from the classes 
of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. Appendix A presents the distribution of applicant winners and losers. 
Constructing unbiased experimental groups was complicated by the fact that losers could reapply for a 
PSS scholarship in their second (PSS1) and third (PSS2) years of law school. To address this 
complication, two steps were taken in assigning lottery participants to control and treatment groups. First, 
only an individual’s lottery outcome the first time they apply for a PSS was taken into account. The 
treatment group then consists of all first-time applicant winners. The analogous control group is comprised 
of all those not awarded a scholarship the first time they apply.  However, due to the possibility of 
reapplying, this group includes 51 lottery losers that receive scholarships at a later stage, which 
                                                 
13 This idea has intuitive appeal in explaining why some people considering professional schools express the seemingly 
irrational fear of getting “sucked into the private sector.” 
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contaminates identification of the treatment effect.
14 To eliminate this bias, those 51 original losers who 
eventually win the lottery were excluded from the control group, generating a “net control group” that 
includes only the lottery applicants that never won a scholarship.  
 
However, eliminating eventual winners from the initial pool of losers introduces a potentially strong 
bias due to the fact that re-applicants are dropped from the control group only.  If multiple applicants have 
different characteristics than one-time applicants, dropping a large number of these types from the control 
but not the treatment group will alter the equal distribution of characteristics across experimental groups 
achieved by random assignment. If the propensity to reapply is correlated with any individual characteristics 
influencing career choice (such as level of interest in public service), mean differences in job outcomes 
between control and treatment groups will be biased measures of program impact on career outcomes.  
 
To eliminate this b ias, sample weights were constructed to account for missing observations. 
Specifically, applicants who applied multiple times and repeatedly lost the lottery were over-weighted to 
reflect the total number of re-applicants including those who won and were dropped. Essentially, it is 
assumed that every applicant has an individual “type” –  one-time, two-time or three-time propensity to 
apply. While types are unobservable among lottery winners, random assignment in second- and third-year 
lotteries ensures that winning re-applicants are characterized by the same type distribution as repeat losers 
conditional on the number of applications. In this manner, losers’ reapplication rates can be used to 
determine the correct distribution of types among the winners.
15 The weighting formulas are described in 
detail in the notes to Appendix A. 
 
Second, the sample weights had to be adjusted to account for differences in the probabilities of 
winning according to the type of lottery to which the student first applied – PSS0, both PSS0 and RTK, 
PSS1 or PSS2. Because of the smaller number of PSS1 and PSS2 first-time applicants and the smaller 
pool of eligible RTK applicants, these participants had a higher probability of ending up in the treatment 
group, and therefore the treatment group is composed of a higher percentage of PSS1, PSS2 and RTK 
                                                 
14 In this case, it would be impossible to separate the effects of losing the PSS in an early year from winning at a later 
point, so that estimates of scholarship effect would be biased downwards This is analogous to the standard problem of 
control group members seeking outside treatment.  See Robins (1998) for a discussion.  
15 Hence, it was assumed that, since two-thirds of losers reapplied once and one-fourth reapplied twice, so would have 
the same fractions of winners.                                                                                                              
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applicants relative to PSS0 applicants. Thus, sample weights of control subjects in the last three categories 
were adjusted to equate the distribution of lottery types across treatment and control groups. Table 5 gives 
the precise sampling weights for the five types of lottery.  
 





# Control  # Treatment 
Weight assigned 
to controls only 
Control 
(weighted) 
PSS0 only  0.310  109  49  1  109 
RTK & PSS0  0.520  49  53  2.406  118 
PSS 1  0.407  32  22  1.529  49 
PSS 2  0.571  3  4  2.966  9 
 
Finally, in constructing the comparison groups to be used in the analysis, an important concern over 
non-random assignment arises from the fact that many applicants for first-year scholarships did not attend 
NYU.
16 While an intent-to-treat analysis, in which all applicants are included in the study regardless of 
participation, would yield unbiased comparison groups, in practice, since data was only collected for NYU 
attendees it was necessary to exclude from the analysis all lottery applicants (both winners and losers) that 
failed to matriculate.
17 If matriculation rates are correlated with lottery outcome as well as other individual 
characteristics, the enrolled lottery winners and losers will not reflect a random assignment of individuals to 
experimental groups. For instance, if very dedicated students’ acceptance decisions depend more on 
scholarship money, then lottery winners will have higher matriculation rates and also be, on average, more 
dedicated to public interest work.
18 Since the only difference between lottery winners and losers in the 
value of law school is that control group members face (interest-free) tuition debt while in school as 
opposed to after graduation, sample selection would only occur if applicants are characterized by time-
inconsistent debt aversion. In that case, we would expect a higher matriculation rate among first year lottery 
winners, producing a higher average level of debt aversion within the treatment group. To the extent that 
                                                 
16 Unfortunately, there is currently no data on enrollment according to lottery outcome available from the NYU Law 
School admissions office. However, anecdotal evidence from one IFAS administrator reveals surprise at “ how few 
members of the control group actually enrolled” (Kornhauser, 2001). 
17 For a discussion of non-random non-compliance with missing data, see Tsitsi, et. al.  (1999). 
18 On the other hand, if the correlation between matriculation rates and lottery outcome is equally distributed across all 
applicant types, the random assignment assumption remains valid.                                                                                                              
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debt aversion is either itself a determinant of career choice or correlated with other individual characteristics 
that influence job outcomes, the estimate of program impact will be biased.  
 
While complicating the analysis of job sector outcomes, matriculation patterns according to lottery 
outcome constitute an important program outcome in themselves. The following section on experimental 
results begins by exploring the effect of lottery outcome on enrollment decisions. 
 
5  Experimental Outcomes 
 
5.1  Matriculation Rates 
 
Table 7 presents unweighted summary statistics of the experimental data, providing a rough check 
of random assignment among matriculating applicants.
19 Any statistically significant differences in mean 
characteristics among matriculating winners and losers can be assumed for incentive reasons to imply a 
greater propensity to enroll among lottery winners. 
 
                                                 
19 Here, as in Tables 8-9, partial weights are applied only to equate the application lotteries in the treatment and control 
groups, and no control group members are excluded as in the final weighting scheme. Comparison of partially weighted 
and fully weighted sample means of the treatment and control groups verifies that the final weighting scheme, in which 
51 eventual winners are dropped and the control group reweighted, does not alter the distribution of demographic traits.                                                                                                              
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Table 7. Sample characteristics 
  N  control  treatment  |tD| 
Female   193/128  0.62  0.64  0.29 
Age  193/128  31.2  30.9  0.71 
Married  193/128  0.074  0.094  0.66 
Minority  193/128  0.076  0.055  0.65 
Parents’ net worth  148/95  244964  151515  1.78 
Parents’ net income  148/95  51962  60206  0.68 
Home worth  148/95  49322  39012  0.60 
LSAT  193/128  167.5  168.7  2.01 
Undergraduate GPA  193/128  3.63  3.63  0.01 
Rank of undergraduate institution  193/128  4.08  4.06  0.23 
Undergraduate school public  193/128  0.274  0.304  0.49 
Undergraduate debt  193/128  3653.5  5037.0  1.36 
Other pre-law debt  193/128  4319.5  2308.0  0.94 
Years of PI experience  193/128  0.98  1.24  0.84 
Foreign  193/128  0.008  0.008  0.06 
 
The statistically significant difference between mean Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores, 
with lottery winners averaging 1.2 points higher than lottery losers, suggests that applicants in fact have 
differential enrollment rates according to lottery outcome. Thus, it appears that postponing debt encourages 
applicants to enroll in law school. Since lottery losers should be aware that career-contingent financial 
assistance with the same option value as the tuition waiver is available to them at NYU regardless of lottery 
outcome, a higher matriculation rate among lottery winners provides important evidence of time-
inconsistent debt aversion.  
 
Because sample selection is presumed to occur only among first-year scholarship applicants who 
are deciding whether and where to attend law school, I continue by comparing the following pre-law-
school characteristics among the sub-sample of first-year lottery applicants only: sex, race, LSAT scores, 
undergraduate GPA, rank of undergraduate school, parental net worth, net parental income, undergraduate 
debt, and other outstanding debt.
20 Among the first-year matriculating applicants, the only significant 
differences between the experimental groups in pre-law school characteristics is in family assets. 
                                                 
20 Table 8 is analogous to Table 7, except that only Year 0 PSS and RTK lottery participants are included.                                                                                                              
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Table 8. Sample characteristics of PSS0 and RTK applicants only 
  treatment  control  |tD| 
Minority  0.082  0.059  0.58 
Female  0.68  0.65  0.38 
LSAT  168.7  167.7  1.30 
Undergraduate GPA  3.63  3.66  0.71 
Rank of undergraduate institution  4.09  4.13  0.35 
Parental net worth  151072  267660  1.96 
Parental net income  60475  50737  0.71 
Undergraduate debt  4817  3274  1.37 
Other entering debt  2358  5130  1.06 
 
However, f urther dissimilarity in entering lottery participants suggestive of t ype differences 
according to lottery outcomes is evident from a comparison of correlations between pre-lottery 
observables, presented in Table 9. From these data, it appears that two types of sample selection are 
occurring at the enrollment stage. First, tuition waivers lead higher quality students to matriculate at NYU. 
This is evident by the fact that not only are LSAT scores lower in the control group, but LSAT scores and 
undergraduate GPA have reverse correlations across experimental groups. In the control group, as in the 
population of non-participants, these two performance measures are inversely related and thus during 
school on post-graduate career choice, comparing the matriculating treatment and control group members 
does provide an unbiased estimate of the “total program effect” – that is, the effect of debt burden on 
career decisions together with the effect of prospective debt burden on the decision to enroll. From a 
policy perspective, both channels of impact of offering up-front tuition waivers are of interest.
21  
 
                                                 
21 Aside from using the matriculating lottery losers as a control group, a different option would have been to select a 
matched sample from the pool of non-applicants, as in Rouse’s (1998) quasi-experimental evaluation of the Milwaukee 
School Choice Program.  In my case, this approach is inappropriate because lottery participation is a decision variable 
undeniably highly correlated with job outcomes.  Non-applicants who are comparable to applicants but who did not 
apply for some exogenous reason would be extremely difficult to identify in the data (i.e. people planning to apply but 
misread the application date, etc).                                                                                                                
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Table 9: Correlation between LSAT and pre-law school characteristics 
  treatment  control 
  LSAT  LSAT 
Undergraduate GPA  0.0363  -0.2185 
Rank of undergraduate institution  0.0513  0.0464 
Female  -0.1744  -0.1266 
Minority  -0.5062  -0.4269 
Parental net worth  -0.0123  0.2274 
Parental income  0.0295  -0.1098 
Undergraduate debt  -0.0665  -0.1321 
Other entering debt  0.0070  0.0456 
 
In the second round of estimates, I attempt to correct for sample selectivity in order to estimate the 
average treatment effect of tuition waivers. In particular, I adjust for observable confounding variables 
arising from potentially endogenous matriculation rates by comparing control group members to a matched 
sub-sample of treatment group members with propensity score matching techniques. The resulting matched 
outcome, along with a descriptive investigation of control and treatment differences, provides inference on 
the size of the selection effect.
22  
 
5.2.1 Mean Differences in Job Placement 
 
In comparing the impact of the two forms of loan assistance, the fundamental outcome of interest is 
the likelihood of pursuing a career in public interest law. To approximate long-range career paths, I look at 
both the first job placement of graduates as well as subjective statements of career plans from the exit 
survey. Unfortunately, the first job placement measure is complicated by the fact that graduates also have 
the third option of accepting an intermediate position as a law clerk. Mindful of this shortcoming, I begin by 
looking at the allocation of experimental subjects across all three sectors.
23 As shown in Table 10, there is 
a significant difference between the experimental groups in the distribution of first job placements.  
                                                 
22 With the exception of the propensity score estimates, the sampling weights described in the previous section are 
applied throughout the statistical analysis.  
23 The eleven experimental subjects that fail to report post-graduate employment are assumed for incentive reasons to 
not be employed in qualifying public interest jobs.                                                                                                              
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Table 10. First job placement of graduates 
  control  treatment  |tD| 
Public interest law   38.6%  34.4%  0.84 
Non-qualifying employment  40.1%  25.0%  2.14 
Clerkship  21.3%  40.6%  3.18 
N  193  128  c
2=11.51 
 
In pair-wise comparisons, treatment group subjects are 14.9 percentage points (37.5%) less likely 
to take a non-qualifying job and 19.3 percentage points (91%) more likely to take a one-to-two year 
clerkship after leaving law school. The difference across treatment and control groups in terms of the 
likelihood of directly entering the public sector is small and insignificant. Nonetheless, these results indicate 
that, despite the equivalent net present value of these two programs, career-contingent tuition subsidies are 
associated with a lower rate at which law students with a self-reported interest in public sector work 
abandon this pursuit immediately after law school.   
 
Unfortunately, the relationship between financial aid timing and the primary outcome of interest, the 
long-term (post-clerkship) proportion of public interest lawyers, will depend on the rate at which clerks 
enter public interest work. Information on the pattern of post-clerkship employment is currently available 
for the classes of 1998, 1999 and 2000 from follow-up surveys mailed to graduates two years out of 
school. Overall, 68% of the 70 clerks in these classes transition to public interest jobs and five take second 
clerkships.
24 While the sample is small, the rate of post-clerkship public interest employment differs 
substantially by lottery outcome: 78% of lottery winners and only 43% of lottery losers take public interest 
jobs. Table 11 incorporates this data and reports the updated job sector distribution for the classes of 
1998-2000 only.
25 Here, the same patterns as in Table 10 are observed. Members of the treatment group 
are roughly one-third (32%) more likely to enter public interest law after two years. 
 
                                                 
24 The nine observations without follow-up data are again assumed to not be working in qualifying public interest jobs. 
25 Analogous weights are constructed for the participants in the classes of 1998-2000 only, described in Appendix B.                                                                                                               
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Table 11. First job placement of graduates after 2-years 
  control  treatment  |tD| 
Public interest law  50.1%  66.0%  1.97 
Non-qualifying employment  48.7%  31.9%  2.03 
Second clerkship  1.2%  2.1%  0.56 
N  146  94  c
2=5..91 
 
Classifying the five students in second clerkships as public sector lawyers yields a 33% placement 
differential across experimental subjects in the classes of 1998-2000:
26 
 
Table 12a.  Fraction in public interest law  
  control  treatment  D  |tD|  N 
Public interest law  51.3%  68.1%  16.8  2.03  239 
 
Regression controlled means accounting for year of graduation, lottery type or demographic 
characteristics consistently produce an even larger treatment effect, ranging from 17-18 percentage points. 
Not surprisingly, the difference in public interest law placement is concentrated among applicants to three-
year tuition lotteries among whom the debt difference is the largest. Looking only at PSS0 and RTK 
applicants in Table 12b, we observe an 18.6 percentage point differential in the rate of public interest law 
between three-year lottery winners and losers. On the other hand, the rate of clerkships among these 
applicants is almost identical to the sample average (18.4%). The public interest law differential among 
PSS1 and PSS2 individuals is 10 percentage points, although insignificant due to the small number of late 
applicants.  
 
Table 12b. Fraction in public interest law, RTK and PSS0 lottery participants only 
  control  treatment  D  |tD|  N 
Public interest law  52.8%  71.4%  18.6  2.69  200 
 
                                                 
26 Alternatively, assuming they enter the private sector gives the same treatment effect as in Table 11 – 32% with a t-
statistic of 1.97. Thus we can safely assume the real effect lies between 32 and 33%. However, anecdotal evidence 
supports the prediction that students taking more than one clerkship disproportionately end up in public sector work.                                                                                                              
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As an approximation of final job outcomes for all four classes of study subjects, I use data on 
clerks in the classes of 1998-2000 to assign predicted job sectors to clerks in the class of 2001 based on a 
vector of coefficients from a probit estimation of public interest employment on the following individual 
characteristics: age, sex, minority, marital status, public interest commitment reported in the exit survey – 
including what fraction of the next decade a student plans to spend in a private law firm and in non-profit 
law, the importance of social contribution, and the importance of salary –, and first-year and second-year 
summer public interest employment dummies.
27 Based on the predicted placement data for the class of 
2001, clerks in the treatment group are nearly twice as  likely to enter public interest work. Incorporating 
predicted values for clerks in the class of 2001 to generate an expected distribution of sample-wide first 
job placement produces a similar estimate of program effect on public interest work for all four classes: 
 
Table 13a. Predicted final job sector for all classes (19998-2001) 
  control  treatment  D  |tD|  N 
Public interest law  48.7%  64.9%  16.2  2.37  320 
 
Table 13b shows the predicted distribution for early applicants only: 
 
Table 13b. Predicted final job sector for all classes (19998-2001),  RTK and PSS0 lottery participants only 
  control  treatment  D  |tD|  N 
Public interest law  50.7%  68.6%  17.9  2.30  260 
 
As an alternative outcome measure not complicated by clerkships,  I also look at exit survey  data 
on long-term career plans among 3-year lottery participants. Specifically, students are asked about the job 
settings in which they plan to spend the next ten years of their careers. Table 14 reports the percentage of 
the next 10 years students plan to spend in private and public interest law, net of time out of the labor 
force. This data shows a pattern strikingly similar to the distribution of first job placement. 
 
                                                 
27 Choice of covariates based on the observed probability of public interest employment post-clerkship, see Appendix C.                                                                                                              
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Table 14. 10-year career plans
28  
  control  treatment  D  |tD| 
Percentage of years in for-profit law firm  30.2%  18.7%  -11.5%  1.99 
Percentage of years in public interest law  31.2%  56.7%  25.5%  2.37 
Percentage of years in clerkship  5.1%  8.8%  3.7%  1.98 
 
Treatment group subjects report planning to spend 25.5 percentage points more of the next ten 
years in non-profit law,  even higher  than the 18.6 percentage point predicted difference in first job 
placement. It is also evident that this difference does not simply reflects the fact that control group subjects 
also plan to spend a significant less amount of time in a clerkship, which they will substitute for private 
sector work. As reported in Table 15, the mean differences in career settings net of planned fraction of 
next ten years in a clerkship is even larger.  
 
Table 15. 10-year career plans net of clerkship time 
  control  treatment  D  |tD| 
Percentage of years in for-profit law firm  31.6%  19.5%  12.1%  2.10 
Percentage of years in public interest law  33.5%  60.5%  27.1%  2.45 
 
From Tables 14 and 15, it is evident that stated career plans of all participants are consistent with 
observed first job choice. Just as treatment group members are less likely to take an immediate private 
sector job and more likely to take a clerkship, so are they more likely to report a greater planned 
percentage of the next ten years in these settings. This is hardly surprising since most graduates have 
already made first job arrangements at the time of the exit survey. Nonetheless, the exit survey findings 
suggest that patterns of first job choice do not simply reflect a difference in the order of job setting, but 
more likely a long-term difference in career experience. In other words, there is strong evidence from these 
data that the timing of financial aid affects not only the likelihood that a student takes an immediate job in 
public interest law, but also the likelihood that he or she ever does. This implies that the long-term rate of 
public interest employment will depend even more on financial aid timing than the initial estimates suggest. 
 
                                                 
28 Remaining time includes non-legal employment and unsure.                                                                                                              
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The exit survey also provides data on desired job characteristics. Interestingly, while both observed 
job choices and exit survey career plans differ substantially according to financial aid package, the pattern 
of preferences in job characteristics at the end of law school is remarkably similar across experimental 
groups. Only one of 15 job characteristics that students were asked to rank – the importance of practical 
experience – was significantly different at the end of law school. The fact that job preferences, including the 
relative importance of such factors as salary and contribution to society, are virtually equivalent between 
control and treatment groups, yet both stated plans and observed choices differ substantially suggests that 
systematic type differences in work preferences are not driving the experimental result.   
 
5.2.2  Selection Correction Model 
 
As discussed in Section 5.1, one factor plausibly driving the discrepancy in final outcomes is a 
difference in the matriculation rates of law school applicants according to lottery outcome. This section 
attempts to gauge whether or not sample selection is responsible for the previous set of job placement 
results. We have already observed strong evidence of sample selection in a comparison of pre-law school 
observables in Tables 7 and 8. In order to isolate selection bias at the matriculation stage, the earlier 
findings suggest the need to account for differences in nonlinear relationships between pre-treatment 
observable characteristics. With this in mind, I construct an alternative set of comparison groups using 
propensity score matching techniques to identify a set of treatment group members best matched to control 
group members based on non-linear relationships between variables associated with the likelihood of 
program participation.
29 Assuming that differential matriculation rates reflect lottery winners being 
disproportionately encouraged to attend, the control “types” are necessarily a subset of the treated. 
Essentially, this procedure attempts to identify that subset of treated individuals most comparable to the 
subset of original control group members who remain after matriculation.  
 
To identify such participants, for each lottery loser I associate a match outcome by way of 
minimum distance estimation according to the following set of pre-treatment characteristics: graduation 
year, RTK applicant, LSAT score, undergraduate debt, undergraduate GPA, undergraduate school rank, 
whether undergraduate school is public, sex, age, minority, graduation year, prior years in public interest 
                                                 
29 This method follows Heckman, et. al. (1997). For an overview of matching techniques, see Meyer (1995).                                                                                                              
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employment, marital status, family net worth, family net income, and the interaction between LSAT and 
GPA, and LSAT and income.
30 In particular, a standard probit over the entire sample estimates a 
maximum likelihood probability that a student was a member of the control group. Predicted match scores 
were then calculated from the vector of coefficients on these variables and assigned to all members of the 
treatment and control groups. Matching outcomes were determined according to kernel-weighted average 
outcomes of all non-treated individuals, and all results were compared for robustness with stratified and 
nearest-neighbor matching.  
 
The general technique is an inverse application of traditional propensity score methods used to 
estimate the average treatment effect in a population (Imbens, 1999). In my method, the difference in 
average job placement between the control group members and the matched subset of treatment group 
members instead estimates the hypothetical effect of treatment on the subgroup of individuals who would 
have matriculated even in the absence of the program. Hence, the difference between this estimate and the 
estimate of gross program effect from the previous section, which also includes an effect on the probability 
of participating and consequent changes in average sample characteristics, is reasonably interpreted as the 
“gross selection effect” – that is, the change in the distribution of average student characteristics plus the 
effect of treatment on these marginal participants. While I am unable to fully identify the average treatment 
effect, decomposing the gross program effect into these two components allows me to rule out the 
possibility of zero average treatment effect as long as a positive program effect is observed among the 
subset of the treated that would have enrolled regardless of lottery outcome. 
 
In the case of public interest placement, that is indeed the case. Table 16 presents the estimated 
average program effect using kernel matching methods on the identified subset of “unconditional” 
participants.
31 Note that the control group means are identical to the previous estimate in Table 12b since 
the composition of the control group does not change. In contrast, individuals in the new treatment group 
are just as likely to enter public interest law but substantially  less likely to take a clerkship relative to the 
original set of treatment individuals. 
 
                                                 
30 The sample is for obvious reasons restricted to pre-enrollment lottery applicants (PSS0 and RTK). 
31 Both stratification and random draw nearest neighbor matching produced the same pattern of results.                                                                                                              
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Table 16. Kernel-based matching outcomes 








Public interest law*  0.72.2  0.52.8  - 0.194  0.096 
Clerkship  0.321  0.232  - 0.089  0.067 
*Classes of 1998-2000 only. 
 
The fact that a treatment effect on public interest employment is observed indicates that the gross 
program effect cannot be attributed to selection on observables. This suggests that, unless there is a 
significant amount of selection on unobservables occurring at matriculation, even in a scenario in which 
applicants are informed of the lottery outcome post-matriculation, the influence of educational debt while in 
school would still generate a difference in the rate of public interest placement. In fact, it appears that 
students encouraged to matriculate on account of tuition waivers have lower rates of public interest 
placement, controlling for other factors: the measured effect of treatment for this subset of lottery winners is 
19.4 rather than 18.6 percentage points. Thus, sample selection out of treatment may actually bias 
downward the impact of financial aid timing on career choice. A reasonable explanation consistent with this 
observation is that treatment individuals whose enrollment decision is influenced by debt timing not only 
have higher undergraduate debt and higher LSAT scores, but also have lower average commitment to 
public interest work, controlling for these characteristics. This makes intuitive sense given that non-
matriculaters are those most easily dissuaded by a difference in financial aid timing from either entering 
public interest law or from attending a law school with a high commitment to public interest work.  
 
In the case of clerkships, the propensity score estimates are half as large and insignificant.
32 This 
suggests that, were matriculation rates unaffected by lottery outcomes, debt timing would be associated 
with less of a difference in the rate of clerkships than we observe in the presence of selection. In light of this 
result, sample selection on LSAT scores is a likely explanation for the extreme difference in clerkships 
between the original control and treatment groups, as clerkships are largely merit-based appointments. In 
other words, students with the best outside options lie disproportionately in the margin of influence for 
career-contingent aid at the enrollment stage. 
                                                 
32 Stratified and nearest neighbor matching estimates of ATE are 3-5 percentage points and insignificant.                                                                                                              
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In sum, propensity score estimates of comparable groups of enrolled students indicate that, while 
sample selection on observables into treatment explains much of the difference in rates of clerkships, 
matriculation patterns do not account for the difference in public interest placement between the treatment 
and control groups. Thus, unless there is a significant degree of selection on unobservables occurring at the 
enrollment stage, it appears that, in addition to influencing enrollment decisions, financial aid timing has an 
independent effect on the career decisions of students who matriculate.  
 
5.5  Job Market Signaling 
 
Before concluding that the results of this analysis reflect a response to debt among students, it is 
important to eliminate the possibility of job market signals altering the relative employment prospects of 
treatment and control group members. Despite the fact that PSS were distributed by randomized lottery so 
provide no information on winners and losers, it is conceivable that public interest employers perceive 
career-contingent scholarships as valuable job market signals of quality and commitment to public interest 
work. Since lottery losers are presumably unable to indicate to employers that they applied for a PSS, 
winning the lottery could conceivably alter job opportunities in the public sector. This asymmetry among 
between winners and losers would result in higher average wage offers conditional on ability for 
scholarship-holders, thereby disproportionately encouraging lottery-winners to enter public interest law.  
 
A useful way to test for this possibility would be to look at differences in callback rates and salary 
offers for public interest jobs according to experimental group. Unfortunately, this data is not yet available 
from the IFAS. A much cruder indicator of any significant demand advantage of PSS subjects is found by 
looking at relative wage differences in public interest versus private firms between control and treatment 
groups, controlling for observable measures of ability and commitment level. Assuming that all relevant 
characteristics which are observable to employers are contained in our data set, then a significant positive 
coefficient on the treatment dummy in a regression of starting salary on employee characteristics would 
indicate a premium on scholarship participation. However, if there are important unobservable factors 
influencing employment opportunities, these estimates will also suffer from selection problems so should be 
interpreted with caution.                                                                                                              
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From the regression results in Table 18, it appears that treatment status is unrelated to mean 
sector-specific salary when controlling for indicators of ability and commitment which are plausibly used by 
employers to evaluate candidates. While the desirability of a given job is not fully captured by starting 
salary, especially given the level of compression of starting salaries in all three sectors, a few factors explain 
most of the variation in private sector salaries – including class rank, GPA, age, and the importance of 
social contribution – and treatment status is not among them.  This suggests that financial aid package is an 
unimportant signal of commitment or ability to employers. 
 
Table 18. OLS regression of mean starting salary 
  Private Sector  Non-profit Sector  Clerks 
Group mean  103061  110613  35199  35145  38418  39430 
  Starting salary  |tD|  Starting salary  |tD|  Starting salary  |tD| 
PSS/RTK (treatment)  -5409.52  0.86  1409.12  0.86  983.217  0.62 
RTK winner  -4766.91  0.86  991.10  0.53  -891.411  0.72 
LSAT  2103.20  2.65  -166.09  0.94  -89.0669  0.83 
UG GPA  17987.8  1.72  -5782.70  1.10  2667.72  1.05 
Rank of UG school  7589.24  1.88  940.520  0.74  -536.250  0.56 
Class rank  33223.0  3.39  4242.45  0.86  588.059  0.20 
Last GPA  30545.0  2.28  -7066.16  1.68  462.254  0.13 
Minority  37822.4  3.62  -3701.76  0.99  2607.52  1.33 
Female  15243.6  2.34  -3033.67  1.81  -224.889  0.20 
Age  -176.637  0.33  -629.408  2.04  12.9679  0.07 
Rank  soc. contrib.  -505.445  0.53  72.7360  0.20  68.4256  0.33 
Rank salary  731.023  0.68  -143.938  0.20  -133.298  0.33 
% career plan in PI  -28469.1  2.86  -2568.27  1.01  -3725.14  1.70 
Summer 1 PI job  6135.01  0.86  -3531.93  1.67  1091.23  0.61 
Summer 2 PI job  2597.70  0.32  1260.94  0.69  873.149  0.79 
Adj. R
2  0.6218    0.3753    0.1914   
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6  Conclusions 
 
This study has provided evidence that the timing of educational debt influences career choices. 
According to my results, under a career-contingent financial aid program that offers tuition waivers rather 
than an equivalent amount of loan repayment assistance, rates of first job placement in public interest law 
are roughly one third higher. Very little of this appears to be explained by differential matriculation rates 
according to loan package. Thus, the positive effect of the tuition subsidies on graduates’ rate of public 
interest employment operates not through attracting students more committed to public interest work, but 
by altering the role of debt in students’ post-enrollment career decisions. Recipients of forward looking 
career-contingent financial aid are also nearly twice as likely to take a competitive clerkship after law 
school, though much of this appears to be determined at the enrollment stage.  
 
The fact that career-contingent tuition subsidies are associated with higher rates of public interest 
law than are financially equivalent backward-looking loan repayment schemes provides strong evidence of 
time-inconsistent debt aversion.
33 As discussed in Section 2, there are two possible reasons debt aversion 
could lead students to make career choices that depend on the timing of educational debt. Either debt 
suffered early is perceived to be costlier, or else borrowers’ preferences are characterized by loss averse 
debt aversion, which has the potential to generate a reversal in career preferences when debt is absorbed in 
the first stage. There is significant reason to be doubtful that early debt is perceived to be costlier due to the 
non-binding nature of LRAP. Given that NYU Law School is widely known for offering the most 
comprehensive public service infrastructure of any law school in the nation and actively markets itself as a 
public interest law school, discontinuation or reduction in LRAP benefits should be deemed highly unlikely. 
For these reasons, time-inconsistent debt aversion  such as that which would occur if individuals were 
characterized by loss averse preferences is arguably a more plausible explanation.  
 
Regardless of the mechanism, the policy implication for a school interested in increasing its supply 
                                                 
33 A corresponding piece of evidence on the existence of psychic disutility associated with debt is the fact that a 
significant number of scholarship winners choose not to renew their fellowships while in law school. Since students face 
no interest payments on the loan until they graduate, failure to renew presumably reflects a distaste for career-contingent 
debt once it is known to the student that it will need to be repaid (that is, once a low likelihood of taking a qualifying job 
is determined). Indeed, failure to renew is a near perfect predictor of immediate job in the private sector: 12 of the 14 
lottery winners who fail to renew their scholarship take a job directly in a private law firm.                                                                                                               
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of graduates to the public interest sector is straightforward. By distributing career contingent scholarship 
funds early on in students’ careers rather than after they graduate, a law school’s financial aid policy is 
likely to generate a higher rate of public interest work among graduates. Given that retrospective debt relief 
is currently by far the most common form of career-contingent financial aid, these results imply that up-front 
tuition subsidies would be a more efficient allocation of institutional funds for this purpose. Furthermore, a 
move to forward-looking loans also has the potential to attract a higher quality pool of entering students 
and as a result a higher rate of clerkships, as it appears that students are willing to trade off school quality 
for short-term debt relief.  This effect alone may be of interest to school administrators. As David W. 
Leebron, dean of Columbia University Law School and a 1979 Harvard Law graduate, quoted in a recent 
New York Times article, “There is far more competition among law schools for the best applicants than 
there has ever been in the past … Students who think that a school will be too oppressive, unfriendly or 
impersonal are willing to turn it down — even if it is Harvard — in favor of a school perceived as more 
hospitable” (Glater, 2001).  
 
From a social welfare perspective, a policy change has the potential to increase overall educational 
investment in job sectors with high social returns. While loan repayment encourages some level of this, 
results from the IFAS experiment suggest that forward-looking career-contingent subsidies, such as the 
type that are currently being considered in the British system, would be even more effective in encouraging 
this type of investment. Depending on the degree of external validity of this study, other policy programs 
also attempting to encourage public interest employment through educational loan assistance should bear in 
mind the potential benefit of providing tuition money up-front in place of promises of future payment. If 
other students mirror law school students in their attitudes towards debt, this relatively costless policy 
difference could have significant impact on program effectiveness in raising rates of first-job placement in 
the public interest sector.                                                                                                              
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Appendix A:  Experimental design and construction of sample weights
Root + PSS PSS0 Root/PSS0 PSS 1 PSS 2 Total
Number Applications
† 102 158 260 132 37 429
1st-time apps 260 54 7
2nd-time apps 78 6
3rd-time apps 24
Number Winners 53 49 102 57 20 179
1st-time apps 102 22 4
2nd-time apps 35 2
3rd-time apps 14
Number Losers 49 109 158 75 17 250
1st-time apps 158 32 3
2nd-time apps 43 5
3rd-time apps 10
Number Reapplicants 78 30
1st-time apps 78 6
2nd-time apps 24
Treatment (1st-time apps) 102 22 4 128
Control (1st-time apps) 158 32 3 193
Eventual Winners 49 2 0
Applied twice  35 2
Applied three times  14
Control net of eventual winners 109 30 3 142
Applied once (unweighted) 80 26 3
Applied twice (weighted) 19** 4*
Applied three times (weighted) 10***
Weight (applied twice): 1.81** 1.5*
Weight (applied three times): 4.26***
** Weight equal to the probability of PSS1 reapplicants becoming discouraged (20/43) multiplied by the number of 
PSS1 reapplicant winners (35) plus the number of discouraged losers (20) all divided by the number of discouraged 
losers (20): [20+35(20/43)]/20
*** Weight equal to the probability of reapplying for PSS2 (23/43) multiplied by the number of PSS1 reapplicant winners 
(35) plus the number of reapplicants (24), all divided by the number of losing reapplicants (10): [24+35(23/43)]/10
* Weight equal to total number of PSS2 first-time reapplicants (6) divided by the number who lose (4): 6/4
† Includes only matriculating applicants.                                                                                                             
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Appendix B:  Experimental design and construction of sample weights, Classes of 1998-2000 only
Root + PSS PSS0 Root/PSS0 PSS 1 PSS 2 Total
Number Applications
†
79 121 200 97 37 334
1st-time apps 200 33 7
2nd-time apps 64 6
3rd-time apps 24
Number Winners 44 33 77 40 20 137
1st-time apps 77 13 4
2nd-time apps 27 2
3rd-time apps 14
Number Losers 35 88 123 57 17 197
1st-time apps 123 20 3
2nd-time apps 37 4
3rd-time apps 10
Number Reapplicants 64 30
1st-time apps 64 6
2nd-time apps 24
Treatment (1st-time apps) 71 13 4 88
Control (1st-time apps) 123 20 3 146
Eventual Winners 41 2 0
Applied twice  27 2
Applied three times  14
Control net of eventual winners 82 18 3 103
Applied once (unweighted) 59 14 3
Applied twice (weighted) 13** 4*
Applied three times (weighted) 10***
Weight (applied twice): 1.73** 1.5*
Weight (applied three times): 4.15***
† Includes only matriculating applicants.
* Weight equal to total number of PSS2 first-time reapplicants (6) divided by the number who lose (4): 6/4
** Weight equal to the probability of PSS1 reapplicants becoming discouraged (13/37) multiplied by the number of 
PSS1 reapplicant winners (27) plus the number of discouraged losers (13) all divided by the number of discouraged 
losers (13): [13+27(13/37)]/13
*** Weight equal to the probability of reapplying for PSS2 (24/37) multiplied by the number of PSS1 reapplicant winners 
(27) plus the number of PSS2 reapplicants (24), all divided by the number of losing reapplicants (10): 
[24+27(24/37)]/10                                                                                                             
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Appendix C: Probit Estimate of Probability of Public Interest Law
Class of 1999 -0.1357
(0.144)










Treatment group * Root 0.0209
(0.250)






















Importance of social contribution
Importance of salary
Summer 1 public interest           
employment
Summer 2 public interest             
employment
Planned % of career                                
in private law firm
Planned % of career                                          
in non-profit law                                                                                                             




Law Schools with LRAP: 
1.  American University College of Law 
2.  Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
3.  Boston College Law School 
4.  Brooklyn Law School  
5.  Case Western Reserve University Law School 
6.  Columbia University School of Law 
7.  Cornell University Law School 
8.  Duke University School of Law 
9.  Fordham University School of Law 
10. Franklin Pierce Law Center 
11. George Washington University Law School 
12. Georgetown University Law Center 
13. Harvard Law School 
14. Hofstra University School of Law 
15. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 
16. Loyola University, Chicago School of Law 
17. Loyola University, New Orleans Law School 
18. New York University School of Law 
19. Northeastern University School of Law 
20. Northwestern School of Law  
21. Pace University School of Law 
22. Rutgers University School of Law, Newark 
23. Santa Clara University School of Law 
24. Stanford University Law School 
25. Suffolk University Law School 
26. Temple University Beasley School of Law 
27. Tulane University School of Law 
28. University of California Berkeley Law School 
29. University of California, Davis Law School 
30. University of California, Hastings Law School 
31. University of Chicago Law School 
32. University of Georgia School  of Law 
33. University of Iowa College of Law 
34. University of Michigan Law School 
35. University of the Pacific Law School 
36. University of Pennsylvania Law School 
37. University of San Diego School of Law 
38. University of San Francisco School of Law 
39. University of Southern California Law School 
40. University of Toronto, Faculty of Law 
41. University of Utah College of Law 
 
 
42. University of Virginia School of Law 
43. Valparaiso University School of Law 
44. Vanderbilt University Law School 
45. Vermont Law School 
46. Yale Law School  
                             
 
Law School Public Interest Scholarship Programs: 
1.  Boston College Law School                              
2.  Drake University Law School 
3.  Fordham University School of Law 
4.  Georgetown University Law Center 
5.  Gonzaga University School of Law 
6.  Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 
7.  New York University School of Law 
8.  Northeastern University School of Law 
9.  Santa Clara University School of Law 
10. Stanford University Law School 
11. University of Denver College of Law 
12. University of Iowa College of Law 
13. University of Kansas School of Law 
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Appendix E 
 
OTHER FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PUBLIC SECTOR WORK 
 
Loan Forgiveness/Repayment Assistance 
 
US Government: Perkins loans can be cancelled for full-time service as a teacher in a designated 
elementary or secondary school serving students from low-income families, special education teacher 
(includes teaching children with disabilities in a public or other nonprofit elementary or secondary 
school), qualified professional provider of early intervention services for the disabled, teacher of math, 
science, foreign languages, bilingual education, or other fields designated as teacher shortage areas, 
employee of a public or non-profit child or family service agency providing services to high-risk children 
and their families from low-income communities, nurse or medical technician, law enforcement or 
corrections officer, and staff member in the educational component of a Head Start Program, service as 
a Vista or Peace Corps Volunteer and service in the Armed Forces (up to 50% in areas of hostilities or 
imminent danger).  
 
Army National Guard: Students who serve may be eligible for their Student Loan Repayment 
Program, which offers up to $10,000. (Note: the military and veterans' associations provide many 
scholarships and tuition assistance programs.) 
 
Students who majored in education and teach in Mississippi are eligible for the William Winter Teacher 
Scholar Loan. This program forgives one year of your loan in exchange for one year of service (it 
forgives two years of your loan if you teach in a shortage area). 
 
National Health Service Corps: Offers forgiveness programs to physicians who agree to practice for a 
set number of years in areas that lack adequate medical care (including remote and/or economically 
depressed regions).  
 
California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development: Offers a State Loan Repayment 
Program for resident physicians involved in primary care and community health clinics. 
 
Maryland State Government: State and local government employees who earn less than $40,000 
gross annually may be eligible for a loan assistance/repayment program to study law, nursing, physical 
and occupational therapy, social work and education.  
 
                                                                                    
Public Service Scholarships (Work-contingent Tuition Assistance) 
     
Harvard Kennedy School:  Robert G. Wilmers Program for State & Local Public Service Fellowships: 
Up to 10 Wilmers Public Service Fellows study at the Kennedy School each year. The fellowship 
program is designed “to encourage talented students to pursue public service careers, reward their 
commitment to helping others, and free them of the significant debt burden many incur in graduate 
school.” The fellowships cover the full cost of tuition (two semesters plus a summer session, if required) 
and fees, plus an annual stipend, and recipients must commit to working in public service for three years Erica Field/Working Paper Draft                                                             11/19/2002                                                          
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after completing the program. 
 
New York Teacher’s College: Under the Peace Corps Fellows Grant, former Peace Corps volunteers 
receive reduced tuition at Teachers College in exchange for a two-year commitment to teach 
mathematics, science, bilingual/bicultural education, special education, and Teaching of English to 
Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) in the New York public schools where critical shortages of 
qualified teachers exist in these subjects. 
 
 Massachusetts Tomorrow's Teachers Scholarships:  Established by the state legislature in 1999, the 
program offers four-year scholarships to Bay State high school students in the top 25 percent of their 
class who enroll in a Massachusetts college or university degree program leading to teacher certification. 
Scholarship winners agree to teach in Massachusetts’s public schools for four years upon graduation, 
especially in subject areas or geographical regions and school districts where there is a documented 
teacher shortage. 
 
CUNY’s Teaching Opportunity Program (TOP): Beginning in 2001, the school will provide incentive 
scholarships and special training to highly-qualified students who commit to pursuing teaching careers, 
especially in critical shortage areas such as mathematics and science. Private funding, including 
foundation support, has been obtained to provide tuition assistance to program entrants. 
 
Students who commit to work off one-fifth per year as a State Trooper (or related law enforcement 
official) in Alaska are eligible to receive the Michael Murphy Loan to study law enforcement, law, 
probation and parole, penology, or other related fields. Erica Field/Working Paper Draft                                                             11/19/2002                                                          






LRAP recognizes annual debt service on law school loans approved by NYU, generally covering three 
years of the student expense budget less aid received and less a student contribution calculated at the 
time of initial application for need-based financial aid. Participants may decide to consolidate their loans 
under the Federal Consolidation Loan 
Program, or otherwise extend repayment periods. However, LRAP will only make disbursements to 
participants for actual payments made or monthly payments that would be required on a 10-year 
schedule (whichever is less) for up to ten years following graduation. At annual qualifying incomes of 
less than $37,651, participants pay $0 towards annual debt service on eligible loans.  At annual 
qualifying incomes between $37,651 and $57,651, participants pay 40% of the income in excess of 
$37,651 towards their annual debt service on eligible loans. 
 
For example at a total debt of $75,000: 
 
8         Qualifying  Student   LRAP Annual 
         Incomes    Annual  Disbursements 
Payments                                                                               
$36,000    $0    $11,043 
         $38,000    $140    $10,903 
         $40,000    $ 940    $10,103 
         $42,000    $1,740   $9,303 
         $44,000    $2,540   $8,503 
         $46,000    $3,340   $7,703 
         $52,000    $5,740   $5,303 
         $55,000    $6,940   $4,103 
 
Qualifying income is adjusted annually for inflation and career progression. If graduates seeks LRAP 
benefits after working in a high-paying position, NYU will assume the following: during the years in 
which their gross income exceeded the prevailing public service salary, they contribute, toward debt 
service payments and prepayments of principal forty percent of the amount by which their gross income 
exceeded the prevailing salary. For the purposes of LRAP, the eligible debt will be reduced by the 
amount of such prepayments, regardless of gross income. 
 
Exceptions for Judicial Clerks: 
Alumni who work in judicial clerkships are not eligible for LRAP benefits during the year(s) of their 
clerkship. Graduates who complete a clerkship, and who have met all of the eligibility criteria of the 
program during the clerkship year(s), and who enter LRAP eligible employment immediately following 
the clerkship would receive LRAP benefits retroactively.  
 
                                                 
* Information reprinted from the Financial Aid Office of NYU Law School. 